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Lawyers and Diplomats: Some Personal
Observations
William Bodde, Jr. *
The American experience has proven wrong de Tocqueville's con-
tention that lawyers and missionaries make poor diplomats. Our diplo-
matic history is rich in successful and prominent lawyer-diplomats,
demonstrating that even such a perceptive and sensitive observer of the
American scene as the French historian could be mistaken.
Many nations, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, consider
legal training so valuable that they require it as a prerequisite for enter-
ing the diplomatic service or at least give preference to candidates with
law degrees. The United States has somewhat more liberal entrance
requirements. American Foreign Service Officers are drawn from more
diverse backgrounds, although some have been trained in the law.
Even though the majority of Foreign Service Officers are not law-
yers, the influence of the legal profession on American foreign policy
has been enormous. This is because a large proportion of presidential
political appointments (in both Democratic and Republican adminis-
trations) to diplomatic assignments at home and abroad come from the
legal profession. They bring with them a value system and an ap-
proach to problem solving which is grounded in American law.
Many years ago George Kennan commented on this phenomenon.
He noted a tendency "to transplant legal concepts from the domestic to
the international field: to believe that international society could and
should operate on the basis of general contractual obligations, and
hence to lay stress on verbal undertaking rather than on the exact man-
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ifestation of political interest."' Kennan has touched upon a significant
difference in the way diplomats and lawyers approach international ne-
gotiations. I was recently struck by the difference between .what I
would term the diplomatic-political approach and the lawyer-contrac-
tual approach. In preparing for a graduate seminar on South Pacific
politics that I teach, I had an occasion to review the Compact of Free
Association which was initialed by the United States and by Marshal-
lese President Amata Kabua on behalf of three Micronesian govern-
ments (the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and
Palau)2 in January 1980 (a later version of the Compact was initialed
by the United States and the three Micronesian governments late in
19803). The Compact, when finally approved, and numerous subsidi-
ary agreements will regulate the political, economic, and security rela-
tions between the United States and the three Micronesian
governments after the last remaining United Nations Trusteeship is ter-
minated.4 Given the number of participants-as many as forty to sixty
people from the four governments attended the negotiation sessions-
and the different and sometimes conflicting interests of the four sides, it
is not surprising these agreements took thirteen years to complete. To
complicate matters, there were administration changes in the United
States and fragmentation in the Trust Territory. The first to break
away and sign a separate agreement with the United States for Com-
monwealth status was the Northern Marianas. The others originally
negotiated as a single unit (The Congress of Micronesia), but later split
into three separate political entities: the Federated States of Microne-
sia, the Marshall Islands and Palau.
The Compact of Free Association, a complex and lengthy agree-
ment, is very much the product of the lawyer-contractual approach.5
There are a number of reasons why lawyers have played a central role
I Pffaff, Books: Kissinger and Nixon, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 13, 1982, at 156 (quoting
George F. Kennan).
2 See DEP'T OF STATE, 1980 TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 3; U.N. Trusteeship
Counsel, Note Verbale Dated 4 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General at 3, U.N. Doe T/
1827 (Nov. 5, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Note Verbale].
3 DEP'T OF STATE, 1981 TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 15. This later version
contains many changes from the January version. Note Verbale, supra note 2, at 3. However, this
draft, like the January draft, is a complex, lengthy document, id. at 64, and, thus, my observations
about the January Compact apply equally to it.
4 See DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 3, at 15; Note Verbale, supra note 2, at 2. The United
Nations Trusteeship was established by the Trusteeship for Former Japanese Mandated Islands,
Apr. 2 - July 18, 1947, 59 Stat. 1031, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 123.
5 I was a member of the United States delegation to the Micronesian Political States Negotia-
tions from 1977 to 1980, and have followed the negotiations since that period.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:40(1983)
in negotiating the Compact. After thirty-five years of United States
administration, the Micronesians have become accustomed to and have
adopted the litigious ways of the United States. Consequently, the ne-
gotiations were characterized as adversarial and have had a long and
often acrimonious history. The Micronesians made a decision fairly
early that the best way to protect their interests and to obtain the maxi-
mum benefits from the United States government was to hire prestigi-
ous American law firms to conduct the negotiations. At the same time,
the Micronesian political leadership kept all decisions of policy in their
own hands but let their attorneys conduct the bulk of the negotiations.
Not surprisingly, given their experience, the lawyers set about cre-
ating a document that one attorney described as a model "trust inden-
ture." The Compact attempts to account for every possible
contingency, includes elaborate dispute resolution mechanisms, and is
couched in legal terminology. The result is that the document is diffi-
cult to understand fully without considerable study and effort. Article
II covering foreign affairs, which is one of the shortest articles in the
Compact, takes up two pages of text. It attempts to enumerate the for-
eign affairs authority of the Micronesian governments as fully and as
explicitly as possible.
In contrast, the Cook Islands Act,6 which established a free associ-
ation between New Zealand and the Cook Islands, briefly expresses the
relationship between the Cook Islands, New Zealand, and the Chief of
State-The Queen:
5. External affairs and defence-Nothing in this Act or in the Constitu-
tion shall affect the responsibilities of Her Majesty the Queen in right of
New Zealand for the external affairs and defence of the Cook Islands,
those responsibilities to be discharged after consultation by the Prime
Minister of New Zealand with the Premier of the Cook Islands.7
In actual practice, the authority and competence of the Cook Islands'
government in foreign affairs through practice and interpretation has
expanded to a point since 1964 where they are similar to what the Mi-
cronesian governments will have under the Compact.
This is not in any way to denigrate the Compact or to cast doubts
upon the durability of the political relationship it describes. I am con-
vinced that the underlying political bonds between the United States
and the Micronesian people are very strong and that the United States
will have a close relationship with them for decades to come. My pur-
pose is to use the Compact as an example of the contrast between the
6 Cook Islands Constitutions Act 1964, [1964] N.Z. Stat. No. 69.
7 Id pt. I, § 5.
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two approaches. I would note that one disadvantage of the Lawyer-
contractual approach is that the resulting document's complexity com-
plicates the task of the Micronesian political leaders in obtaining the
support of the Micronesian people which is necessary if the agreement
is to receive majority approval in a United Nations-observed plebiscite.
The complex nature of the Compact may also make it an easier target
for critics in Congress, where it must be approved by both the Senate
and the House of Representatives.
In contrasting the difference between the legal approach and the
diplomatic approach, Ferdinant Thnnies' typologies Gemeinschaft
(community) and Gesellschaft (society) are useful.' The diplomatic ap-
proach shares the Gemeinschaft qualities of primitive or traditional law.
That is, it is outcome-oriented: it attempts to balance conflicting inter-
ests and seeks consensus. The legal approach, on the other hand,
shares the Gesellschaft qualities of English-speaking western societies.
It is procedure-oriented and adversarial: it attempts to address all pos-
sible contingencies and is based upon the principle of do ut des (I give
so that you will give). Some negotiations, such as trade, economic, and
commercial agreements, are much more contractual and the lawyer-
contractual approach is most appropriate. Others, such as arms limita-
tion agreements and the law of the sea treaties, are a mix of the con-
tractual and political. Still others are clearly more oriented towards the
diplomatic-political approach.
In 1981, the United States, on behalf of the Multinational Force
and Observers (MFO),9 negotiated an agreement with the small nation
of Fiji in the South Pacific. The agreement established the conditions
for Fiji's participation in the MFO in the Sinai. At the time, the United
States was having a difficult time drumming up support for the MFO
because many nations, including some of our closest allies, were afraid
that their participation might anger the Arab nations. Fiji was already
contributing to the United Nations peace-keeping Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) and was willing to join the MFO, provided the costs of train-
ing, equipping, and maintaining the troops were underwritten by the
MFO.
Most important decisions in the Pacific Island nations are made by
consensus rather than through an adversarial process. When the nego-
8 F. T6NNIES, COMMUNITY AND SociEry (Charles P. Loomis, Translator 1963).
9 The MFO was created in August 1981 as an alternative to the United Nations Forces and
Observers. Its purpose was to help enforce the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace dated March 26,
1979. For the text of the Protocol establishing the MFO, see 81 DEF'T STATE BULL. No. 2054, at
44-50 (1981).
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tiators from Fiji and the United States met, neither side presented a
position from which they were prepared to fall back under pressure.
Instead, the two sides went over Fiji's proposal point-by-point seeking
ways to reduce the costs to their mutual satisfaction.
For example, Fiji's proposal called for equipping each of the 500
soldiers with a compass. We explained that it was United States Army
practice to supply only one compass to each squad of eight infan-
trymen. The Fiji Government readily agreed, and so it went until an
agreement satisfactory to both sides was achieved. Because of this ap-
proach and the shared interests underlying the negotiations, a consen-
sus was reached. Given this consensus, the agreement is more likely to
survive than if we had depended upon a contractual text to bind us.
Lawyers on both sides (the Foreign Secretary of Fiji is a lawyer)
made sure the text of the agreement was clear, reflected the intentions
of both delegations, and was consistent with international law. How-
ever, legal considerations were not the driving force in the negotiations.
Some years ago, when working on the text of an international
agreement with an extremely able State Department lawyer, my attor-
ney colleague turned to me in frustration and said, "The problem with
you Foreign Service Officers is that you do not believe words have
meanings." He was wrong, of course, in the sense that the diplomatic
profession, like the legal profession, lives by the written word. Policy
options to the President or Secretary, instructions to the field, and inter-
departmental policy decisions are conveyed, for the most part, by the
written word. He who controls what is written has a major influence on
policy, a lesson Henry Kissinger mastered early. Anyone who has ever
tried to obtain concurrence in the State Department for an outgoing
message can testify to the importance diplomats place on words.
But in a more important sense, my attorney colleague was right.
Diplomats, in contrast to lawyers, place more faith in the political un-
derpinnings of international agreements than they do in their texts to
ensure the durability of the agreements. This is especially true in the
case of agreements between sovereign nations. Diplomats are more
likely to be concerned with cultural and linguistic differences among
nations and thus more aware of the limits of what can be accomplished
by the written word alone. In some cultures, the very concept of a con-
tract is different from the Western legal system's and not necessarily
binding on both parties if conditions change. In other cultures, the
symbolic and emotional quality of language is more important than its
role as a conveyor of fact, so that even standard American legal formu-
lations such as "act of God" cause difficulties.
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Experienced diplomats, being aware of the relative lack of interna-
tional judicial machinery to enforce agreements in the event one of the
contracting parties fails to abide by them, look to political solutions.
That is, they operate in the belief that political will is the key to adher-
ence. This political will depends upon the perception of both sides on
how an agreement affects their national interests.
Obviously, the contents of the Compact of Free Association and
the United States-Fiji Agreement on MFO troops are much different.
The former is a fundamental political act which establishes the future
political status of the people of Micronesia, while the MFO agreement
is a relatively short-term agreement between a sovereign nation and an
international organization. The history and dynamics of the Microne-
sian status negotiations, as mentioned earlier, were such that any ap-
proach other than the lawyer-contractual approach was unlikely.
However, the two agreements provide examples of the two approaches.
As George Kennan has stated, relationships within the interna-
tional framework are considerably different from relationships within
the national framework.' 0 To attempt to transplant the practices of one
to the other is likely to cause problems. A lawyer as a diplomat, in my
view, has been the most successful when he or she has made the transi-
tion from the Gesellschaft values of contractual law to the Gemeinschaft
values of international negotiations.
It has been my experience that a creative tension between the two-
value system provides the best means of assuring durable and effective
international agreements. That is, the lawyers on a negotiating delega-
tion must keep the non-lawyers' feet to the fire to assure that agree-
ments conform with international law and the texts convey what their
drafters intended. At the same time, it is the diplomat's responsibility
to ensure that the agreement reflects the underlying political balance of
competing interests critical to the survivability of any international
agreement.
10 See supra text accompanying note 1.
